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Abstract 
 
This article examines the impact of diasporas on secessionist conflicts, focusing on 
the Albanian, Armenian, and Chechen diasporas and the conflicts in Kosovo, 
Karabakh and Chechnya during the 1990s. How do diasporas radicalize these 
conflicts? I argue that despite differences in diaspora communal characteristics and 
the types of the secessionist conflicts, a common pattern of mobilization develops. 
Large-scale diasporic support for secessionism emerges only after independence is 
proclaimed by the local elites. From that point onwards diasporas become engaged in 
a conflict spiral, and transnational coalitions are formed between local secessionist 
and diaspora groups. Depending on the organizational strength of the local strategic 
center and the diasporic institutions, these coalitions endure or dissipate. Diasporas 
exert radicalization influences on the conflict spiral on two specific junctures – when 
grave violations of human rights occur in the homeland and when local moderate 
elites start losing credibility that they can achieve the secessionist goal. 
 
Keywords: diaspora, secessionism, mobilization, radicalization, Balkans, Caucasus  
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Introduction 
Scholars on civil wars and secessionism are increasingly interested in the 
relationship between diaspora mobilization and secessionist conflicts. Domestic level 
explanations do not sufficiently explain the onset, duration, and termination of civil 
wars. Starting in the 1990s studies asserted that international actors – such as kin-
states, refugees, distant and regional powers, and international organizations – 
influence the course and outcomes of secessionism. Mounting empirical evidence 
demonstrated that conflict-generated diasporas – such as the Albanian, Armenian, 
Irish, Tamil, and Palestinian – helped to perpetuate conflicts. The growing pace of 
globalization created more opportunities for diasporas to establish viable linkages to 
their homelands via the Internet, global media, and inexpensive transportation. 
Understanding diaspora mobilization with regard to secessionist conflicts became a 
theoretical necessity. 
This article assesses the impact of conflict-generated diasporas on secessionist 
conflicts by offering theoretical innovation in three ways. First, while a number of 
studies analyzed either diaspora politics or secessionism, this study combines both 
and focuses on diaspora mobilization vis-à-vis local elites. Secondly, case studies on 
diasporas and secessionist conflicts exist, but lack systematic comparison. This article 
derives common patterns for diaspora mobilization by comparing three different cases 
of  conflict-generated diasporas – the Albanian, Armenian, and Chechen – and their 
linkages to secessionist conflicts in the Balkans and the Caucasus. Finally, this study 
is the first to explore the timing and sequencing of transformative events during 
diaspora mobilization. 
The overarching question addressed is: how do diasporas exert a radicalizing 
impact on the secessionist conflicts of their homelands? The study also examines 
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whether diasporas start secessionist conflicts and whether diasporas become 
radicalized themselves. 
I review the emerging literature on diasporas and conflicts and established 
accounts on external actors and internal conflicts. Then I explain the value of the 
transnational social movements literature for the study of diaspora mobilization, lay 
out the research design and introduce the cases. I argue that despite differences in 
diaspora communal characteristics and the secessionist conflict types, a common 
pattern of mobilization develops. Large-scale diasporic support for secessionism 
emerges only after independence is proclaimed by local elites. From that point 
onwards diasporas become engaged in a conflict spiral, and transnational coalitions 
are formed between local secessionist and diaspora groups. Depending on the 
organizational strength of the local strategic center and the diasporic institutions, these 
coalitions endure or dissipate. Diasporas exert radicalizing influences on homeland 
politics at two junctures – when grave violations of human rights occur in the 
homeland and when local moderate elites start losing credibility that they can achieve 
the secessionist goal. 
 
Major theoretical accounts 
The emerging scholarship on diasporas and conflicts goes back to 
Collier and Hoeffler’s influential statistical study demonstrating that civil wars 
resist resolution if they are linked to large diasporas (2000). Stateless 
diasporas are more likely to remain involved with homeland politics as long as 
the nationalist struggle continues (Sheffer 2003). Diasporas generated by 
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 4 
conflicts rather than by voluntary migration  are especially likely to maintain a 
trauma of displacement and a myth of return that durably link them to a 
homeland territory (Scheffer 2003, Lyons 2006). Diasporas – such as the 
Jewish and Armenian –  may develop interests differing from those of the local 
elites in order to preserve their own diasporic identity (Shain 2002). 
Some authors of particular case studies (Albanian, Croatian, Ethiopian, 
Irish, Tamil) captured practices of diaspora engagement with internal conflicts. 
Diasporas send labor remittances and humanitarian aid, recruit fighters, lobby 
homeland governments and int rnational organizations, disseminate 
propaganda, stage demonstrations, and tap into resources of criminal 
networks (Byman 2001, Hockenos 2003). 
The deficiencies of this literature, focused specifically on case studies, 
lead us to draw theoretical insights from more established accounts on 
external actors and internal conflicts. External actors intervene due to 
instrumentalist motives that include geopolitical interests, political and 
economic gains, military concerns, and gaining negotiating leverage 
(Heraclides 1990, Taras and Ganguly 2006). Affective motivations relate to 
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self-esteem established through national, religious, or racial identification, 
historic or recently inflicted injustice, and humanitarian considerations 
(Heraclides 1990, Carment and James 2000). Locked into domestic 
competition, leaders in states external to the conflict use their constituencies’ 
ethnic ties to advance their domestic agendas and induce their states to 
intervene in the conflict (Saideman 2001). With their identity-based ties, kin-
states are often bound in an interactive ‘triadic nexus’ with nationalizing states and 
minorities, where signals from one influence the behavior of others (Brubaker 1996, 
Jenne 2007). Moreover, in separatist and irredentist crises where the institutional 
constraints in the homeland are low, transnational ethnic ties become 
important for local actors to exploit (Carment et al. 2006). 
Diasporas are identity-based actors like kin-states, but do they 
intervene in similar ways? Generational differences within diasporas matter, 
and both powerful individuals and institutions exert major influence. Thus, 
some scholars turn for theoretical leverage to scholarship on transnational 
social movements, allowing to unpack the term ‘diaspora’ and to delineate 
patterns and mechanisms linking the local and the global: ‘Boomerang effects’ 
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and ‘spirals’ are used to pressure authoritarian regimes to adopt human rights 
change (Keck and Sikkink 1998, Risse 1999). Local issues are reframed to 
appeal to global actors and vice versa (Bob 2005, Tarrow 2005). Coalitions 
and networks develop across borders (Della Porta et al. 2005). The opening 
of local and global political opportunity structures affects various types of 
mobilization (Sikkink 2005). Mechanisms—such as attribution of opportunity 
and threat, frame alignment and brokerage—concatenate in the transnational 
realm (McAdam et al. 2001, Tarrow 2005). A combination of injustice and 
hope becomes an important emotional referent for the launching of social 
movements (Aminzade and McAdam 2001). Fear and anger associated with 
war and repression often trigger the use of violence. 
Few scholars of diaspora politics emphasize the particularistic identity-
based character of diaspora mobilization in contrast to the universalistic 
solidarities binding other transnational social movements. They apply some 
building blocks of social movement theory to the identity-based character of 
diaspora politics (Wayland 2004, Smith and Stares 2007). Adamson 
discusses causal mechanisms operating during diaspora mobilization. 
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 7 
‘Transnational brokerage’ builds on McAdam at al (2001) understanding that 
‘brokerage’ is the linking of two or more previously unconnected social sites 
by a unit that mediates their relations with one another or with other sites. 
‘Ethnic outbidding’ takes place ‘when parties or elites attempt to outdo each other, 
leading to a cycle of polarization that fuels extremism’ (Adamson 2009). 
 
Research Design and Introduction of Cases 
The term diaspora is used with Brubaker’s (2005) understanding that 
diaspora is ‘a category of practice, project, claim and stance, rather than as a 
bounded group.’ A diaspora is not simply constituted of the number of 
immigrants of various generations, but only of those who pro-actively make 
claims about their descent. The term is also limited to include only ethno-
national groups residing outside territories adjacent to the homeland, which 
Anderson (1998) calls ‘long-distance nationalists’. 
I adopt two more definitions. Secessionism is ‘an attempt by an ethnic 
group claiming homeland to withdraw with its territory from the authority of a 
larger state of which it is a part’ (Horowitz 1991). Secessionism often occurs 
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 8 
alongside irredentism, understood either as the demand of a kin-state to 
incorporate into its territory co-nationals living in another state, or as the 
desire of an ethnic group inhabiting territories outside the kin-state to seek 
reunion (Chazan 1991). I introduce the two terms in order to consider the Armenian 
case where secessionism occurs first and is followed by de facto if not de jure 
irredentism. 
This study’s scope is limited to cases of conflict-generated diasporas linked to 
secessionist conflicts  in the post-communist world. These cases are characterized by 
a common point of departure of secessionism in 1989-1991, communist institutional 
legacies, and the lack of durable linkages between diaspora populations in the West 
and their ethnic brethren in the East during the Cold War. These characteristics 
distinguish these diasporas from others linked to secessionism in Africa and Asia, 
where conflicts stem from decolonization. The Tamil diaspora has been mobilized for 
the secessionist movement in Sri Lanka since the 1970s. The Sikh diaspora supported 
Khalistan’s secession from India in the 1980s. The Kurdish diaspora in Europe has 
been mobilized in support of territorial demands in southern Turkey since the 1980s. 
The Israeli and Palestinian diasporas have supported their ethnic brethren in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict since the late 1940s. While my findings could be further 
tested on the larger population of cases, this study makes a theoretical contribution by 
unpacking undiscovered processes of diaspora mobilization vis-a-vis secessionism in 
comparative perspective. 
I select the Albanian, Armenian, and Chechen diasporas on a control variable. 
The conflicts stem from autonomist regions in ethno-national federations (former 
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Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia), where an ethno-national system of government 
was institutionalized. Kosovo was a constituent unit of Serbia, Karabakh of 
Azerbaijan, and Chechnya of Russia. Institutional organization on an ethno-national 
basis is considered a prerequisite for minority secessionist demands when totalitarian 
regimes open to competitive politics (Bunce 1999). Unlike titular republics whose 
nationalities were entitled to a right to self-determination, autonomous regions 
enjoyed self-government on an ethno-national basis, but no self-
determination. Thus, th y became especially susceptible to violent secession. 
Serbia, Azerbaijan and Russia employed repressive practices respectively in 
Kosovo (1991-1999), Karabakh (1991-1994), and Chechnya (1991-2003). 
The secessionist conflicts and diaspora characteristics differ significantly. The 
Kosovo and Chechen conflicts are characterized by ‘secessionism only’, while 
the Karabakh conflict is mixed with irredentism.1 The Kosovo and Karabakh 
cases involve a kin-state (Albania, Armenia), while there is none in the 
Chechen case. A kin-state can act in favor of secessionism. In its absence, 
secessionists may solicit more support from the diaspora. The dynamic of 
large-scale violence also differs. In Karabakh violence ensued almost 
immediately following the declaration of independence. In Kosovo it occurred 
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after a non-violent secessionist movement had lost domestic support. 
Violence erupted in Chechnya after a local movement declared independence 
and after Chechnya’s status was not resolved despite a de facto Chechen 
victory in the first war. 
The three diasporas also differ. The Armenian is the oldest and most 
institutionalized. It originated in the 11th century, but its identity was defined by 
the 1915 genocide wh n around 1, 5 million Armenians were massacred in 
the collapsing Ottoman Empire (Tölölyan 2000). Dispersed populations settled 
in the Middle East, and later in Western Europe and the US (Panossian 1998). 
Few emigrants came from Armenia proper and Karabakh. They started 
migrating en masse only in the 1990s due to the war in Karabakh and 
Armenia’s drastic economic decline. At present the Armenian diaspora is 
global, with large communities residing in Russia, the US, France, Georgia 
and Lebanon.2 Nevertheless, its diasporic identity and institutions are defined 
by an older generation linked to the 1915 genocide. The most influential 
diaspora group is the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF), widely 
known as ‘Dashnaks’, facing a few weak opponents (Panossian 1998). 
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The Albanian diaspora is more recent and less institutionalized. 
Albanians started migrating only in the late 19th century. They settled mostly in 
the US, while during communism ‘guest-worker’ programs for Yugoslav 
citizens allowed Kosovo Albanians to work in Western Europe. Economic 
crisis in Albania and Macedonia and repression in Kosovo in the 1990s 
created the largest Albanian emigration wave. Albania alone sent around 
900,000 people abroad (Kosta 2004). The estimated more than 1 million 
Albanian emigrants are concentrated in the US, Switzerland, Germany, 
Greece, Italy and Turkey.3 Unlike the globally defined Armenian diaspora 
institutions, the Albanian ones are more specific to nation-states. Before 1990 
their strongest presence was in the US, most notably the Pan-Albanian 
organization, Vatra (Hockenos 2003). 
The Chechen diaspora is the most recent and least institutionalized. Hostilities 
between Ottomans and Russians in the 19th century prompted Chechens to 
relocate to adjacent regions and territories of present-day Turkey, Jordan, 
Syria and Iraq (Kailani 2002, Shishani and Moore 2005). Large-scale 
emigration did not take place until Josef Stalin inaugurated forced 
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deportations within the Soviet Union in 1944, which left a large Chechen 
community in present-day Kazakhstan and a collective trauma associated with 
exile. During communism Chechens also moved to Russia.4 Due to the wars 
of the 1990s, Chechens moved to the US and Western Europe, establishing 
some presence in Denmark and Germany. The Chechen diaspora in Moscow 
remained the most influential. Diasporic institutions were weak if at all formally 
organized. 
If the secessionist conflicts and diasporic characteristics are different, 
but patterns of diaspora mobilization are similar, then it is theoretically 
interesting to unpack the processes leading to this common mobilization. I do 
not aim to explain the radicalization of domestic politics by weighing the 
causal impact of diasporas’ influences against other potential domestic or 
external factors, but to understand the process of diaspora mobilization and 
how it exerts radicalization influences on local politics. Hence, the dependent 
variable is ‘diasporic radicalization impact’. I define it in line with McAdam et 
al.’s (2001) understanding of radicalization as the capacity to aid local actors 
to ‘adopt more extreme political agendas and transgressive forms of 
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contention.’ The Albanian diaspora exerted a radicalizing impact on the 
Kosovo conflict by aiding the violence-oriented Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) 
in 1998-1999. The Armenian diaspora aided radical elements that ousted the 
more democratically oriented Armenian President Ter Petrossian from power 
in 1998. External Islamic elements aided the growth of radical Islamism in 
Chechnya in 1996-1999. 
 
----- TABLE 1 HERE ----- 
 
The independent variable is a ‘response to transformative events in the 
homeland’. Under ‘transformative events’ social movement theory 
understands turning points in a social movement that follow a period of 
organizational work, but precede a ‘take-off’ of mobilization (Hess and Martin 
2006). Considering social movements theory from the vantage point of 
identity-based politics, I argue that these transformative events relate to 
significant threats to diasporic identity – such as grave violations of human 
rights – or to threats to deeply entrenched diaspora interests – such as threats 
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to the success of a secessionist project. 
The study design is based upon a ‘structured focused comparison’ and the 
‘process tracing method’ (George and Bennett 2004). Overarching questions are asked 
from the literature across cases, but the analysis is launched in line with a ‘within-
case’ rather than ‘across-case’ comparison. Such methodology offers an alternative to 
research designs where the requirements for a ‘perfectly controlled comparison’ are 
not met, and is appropriate in designs where sequential logic—such as diaspora 
mobilization—is the subject of research. Hence, the process-tracing method is used to 
rule out alternative explanations and validate theoretical propositions at different steps 
of the mobilization process rather than only at its outset, as a comparative study 
utilizing Mill’s methods would do. This work is based on evidence gathered from 
newspapers, archives, secondary accounts, and personally conducted semi-structured 
interviews selected through snowball sampling. 
 
Process 1: Diasporas Become Part of a Conflict Spiral 
I assert that despite their different make-up, all three diasporas reacted to 
secessionism, but did not cause it. Some individual diaspora members forged 
connections with local secessionists prior to the 1991 declarations of independence, 
but large-scale diaspora mobilization took place only in their aftermath. Weak 
linkages between the East and the West during the Cold War, and immigrant circles’ 
lack of capacity to engage with secessionism prevented diasporas from pro-active 
involvement. Declaration of independence served as a focal point for mobilization and 
triggered two mechanisms: identity-based response to local frames of injustice and 
hope, and attribution of opportunity to secessionism. 
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------ FIGURE 1 HERE ------ 
 
Diasporas had some social, but little political interaction with their ethnic 
brethren prior to the end of communism. The US and UK-based Armenian diaspora 
offered humanitarian aid to victims of the 1988 earthquake in Armenia. Kosovo 
Albanian guest workers traveled freely between Yugoslavia and Western Europe. A 
product of the diaspora, future Chechen president Dzhokhar Dudayev spent most of 
his life in Estonia and Kazakhstan, and returned to Chechnya shortly before the 
declaration of independence. 
Nevertheless, linkages remained weak because the existing diaspora 
organizations were focused on issues other than secessionism. In the Armenian case, 
internal elite competition between Dashnaks and their opponents led each bloc to have 
its own Apostolic Churches, cultural and charity institutions (Panossian 1998). Their 
only point of unity – to resolve the Armenian national question within the confines of 
Soviet politics – was a strong common opposition to secessionism. Operating out of a 
traumatic diasporic identity, they claimed that secessionism could trigger hostilities 
with Russia, an age-old protector of Armenia, causing Turkey to intervene and initiate 
another Armenian genocide. Though linked with the homeland on the civil society 
level when supporting victims of the 1988 earthquake victims, the diaspora 
organizations were caught ‘completely off-guard’ by the 1988 explosion of the 
political movement in Karabakh (Libaridian 1999). 
Atomization of diaspora circles in the Albanian case and loss of identity 
in the Chechen further discouraged diaspora members from a pro-active 
approach. Although Albanian hard-liners founded the Movement for Kosovo in 
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1982 to advocate armed revolt, many of its members died or were imprisoned 
(Judah 2000). Unlike the Albanians or the Armenians, the Chechens had lost 
the salience of their identity. In the Soviet Union they underwent strong 
Russification with rapid assimilation of values, language and lifestyles, and 
pressures to integrate into the Soviet economy (Payin and Popov 1996). In 
Kazakhstan, the Chechens spoke their language primarily at home (Brauer 
2002). In Turkey, they assimilated under the nationalist pressures of President 
Kemal Attatürk in the late 1920s. Their identity was surprisingly preserved in 
Jordan where nationalism was weak. But the Cold War divided Jordan from 
the Soviet Union and linkages between their Chechen populations were 
almost non-existent. 
One can argue that these findings may not represent the universe of cases, 
since the Cold War divide applied to other diasporas linked to the post-communist 
world, but their mobilization was more advanced. Ukrainians lobbied the US 
Congress and institutions to endorse Ukrainian independence despite fierce US 
opposition. Croatian diaspora funds sponsored the nationalist opposition in the 1990 
republican elections (Skrbic 2007). Nevertheless, even in these cases diasporic 
support reacted to processes in the homeland. The diaspora did not mobilize for 
secessionism, local strategists reached out to the diaspora first. 
Locally proclaimed independence in 1991 became a focal point for diaspora 
Page 16 of 48
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rers  ethnic@surrey.ac.uk
Ethnic and Racial Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 17 
mobilization. In an international environment still defined by information deficiencies 
across borders, diaspora entrepreneurs saw in the declaration of independence a 
solution that seemed natural, special and relevant to them, a realization of 
expectation.5 In all three cases, they quickly claimed support for secessionism.6 
In the words of a Vienna-based Albanian activist, ‘the [nationalist Democratic 
League of Kosovo] LDK was finally saying what everybody wanted to hear 
and the Kosovo Albanians in the diaspora flocked to it’ (Hockenos 2003). 
Despite their initial opposition to secessionism, the two Armenian blocs 
quickly backed Armenia’s and Karabakh’s 1991 independence (Panossian 
1998). Chechens in the former Soviet Union participated in the 1991 elections, 
thus creating irregularities since they did not permanently reside in Chechnya 
(Payin and Popov 1995). 
One can argue that declaration of independence could have been an external 
event without inducing diasporas to support secessionism. Yet, it became a 
transformative event because it triggered two mechanisms enabling the diasporas to 
enter a conflict spiral. First was the identity-based emotional response to messages of 
‘injustice’, framed by local secessionists as measures to redress the political future of 
nations captivated by communist regimes. These messages were not necessarily 
targeted at long-distance diasporas, but were part of the overall mobilization 
strategies. Local elites promoted the right to national self-determination as a political 
alternative to communism. These messages resonated well with the conflict-generated 
Page 17 of 48
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rers  ethnic@surrey.ac.uk
Ethnic and Racial Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 18 
aspects of a diasporic identity locked into experiences of injustice. Armenians were 
anchored in the 1915 genocide, Chechens in their 1944 deportation by Stalin, and 
Kosovo Albanians in their exile from communism. However, as Gamson points out, 
‘injustice frames’ cannot motivate for collective action alone unless they trigger 
powerful emotions (1992). In these cases, the emotional referent was hope for change 
that peaked across the former East-West divide in 1989-1991. As Aminzade and 
McAdam argue, when reaction to injustice comes together with hope, social 
movements are likely to take place (2001). 
In these cases, an identity-based emotional identification triggered a second, 
instrumentally-based mechanism, attribution of opportunity to secessionism. As 
McAdam et al. (2001) claim, no opportunity would invite mobilization unless it is 
visible and perceived as such by potential challengers. Secessionism was seen in 
diaspora circles as the viable option to redress past injustices. In contrast to other East 
European countries like Slovakia, Bulgaria or Romania, where minority autonomy or 
integration were considered political alternatives, these options were ignored in these 
three cases. Even the two Armenian blocs, initially opposed to secessionism, 
supported it after 1991. Diaspora Albanians, who earlier associated with the 
Movement for Kosovo, saw an opportunity to pursue a long-cherished independence 
goal. Ruslan Khasbulatov, a power-broker of Chechen descent responsible for 
Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s Chechen policy, saw in the new Chechen President 
Dudajev an ally against pro-Gorbachev elements in the central government. 
Allegedly, he and Yeltsin ordered that demonstrations in support of Chechen 
independence be spared a brutal encounter with the authorities (Lieven 1999). Hence, 
identity-based emotional identification with injustice frames, followed by an 
attribution of opportunity to secessionism made diasporas engage in a conflict spiral. 
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Process 2: Building Transnational Coalitions 
Tarrow (2005) demonstrated that coalitions across borders can be short-lived 
or durable, depending on the actors’ intensity of involvement and the common 
identity developed through collective action. Transnational coalitions were formed in 
all three cases of this study, but had different durations. They lasted from 1991-1997 
in the Kosovo case, from 1991-1992 in the Armenia/Karabakh case, and from 
1991-1996 in the Chechen case. Coalitions operating in the context of 
secessionism differ significantly from those built around universalist claims, 
because a common identity between diasporas and secessionist elites 
precedes the collective action, rather than is developed by it. Moreover, the 
mechanism of brokerage (McAdam et al 2001, Adamson 2009) was 
instrumental in making local secessionists secure tangible support beyond 
rhetoric. Depending on the strength of the strategic center in the homeland 
vis-à-vis major diaspora organizations, these transnational coalitions became 
more or less viable. 
The mediating unit in the brokerage mechanism is the strategic center 
linking networks in the homeland to the diaspora. I develop the term ‘strategic 
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center’ to designate not only secessionist elites, but power brokers who 
pursue secessionist or irredentist strategies out of different territories. In the 
Kosovo case, the strategic center was the shadow government, but it 
operated out of two countries. President Ibrahim Rugova was based in 
Kosovo, and Prime Minister Bujar Bukoshi was in Germany. Focusing their 
efforts on receiving financial support for the shadow institutions and their non-
violent strategy, Bukoshi and other activists paid numerous visits to cultural 
societies, guest worker clubs, and provincial beer halls, where they formed 
LDK branches (Hockenos 2003). As a result, in 1992-1995 new LDK offices 
sprang up in the US, Canada, Australia, Turkey and European countries. In 
the Armenian case, the strategic center was based in Armenia, but maintained 
close links with Karabakh. Although Armenia refused to recognize Karabakh’s 
independence, it established a better relationship with its leaders in 1992, 
intervened militarily on its behalf in the war with Azerbaijan, and reached out 
to the diaspora (De Waal 1996). The Armenian National Movement (ANM) 
government of President Ter Petrossian made a number of high profile 
appointments of Armenian-Americans, such as Foreign Minister Raffi 
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Hovannissian and Secretary of the Security Council Gerard Libaridian 
(Panossian 1998). It also formed the Armenian Fund to channel diaspora 
contributions, including for infrastructural projects in Karabakh. The strategic 
center was based in the secessionist region itself only in the Chechen case. 
Dudayev forged relations primarily with Chechens in Russia. 
 
-----FUGIRE 2 HERE ----- 
 
Instrumental reasoning bound these transnational coalitions. In the 
Kosovo case, the strategic center put little effort into converting already 
existing diaspora institutions for its cause, but built its own branches abroad. It 
remained strong vis-à-vis relatively weak diaspora institutions and became the 
center of a coalition aligned with its goals. This approach confirms Fair’s 
observations that diaspora institutions formed specifically to support internal 
conflict become more effective than those formed around a broader scope of 
issues (Fair 2005). Old Albanian organizations like the US-based Vatra shifted 
attitude in support of  Kosovo over time, but the banner of secessionism was 
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carried by the new Albanian-American Civic League (AACL), linked to the 
LDK. The interest of its leader, former Congressman Joe DioGuardi, was 
initially to maintain his own political career with a meaningful cause abroad 
(Hockenos 2003). 
In the Armenian case, a weak transnational coalition emerged, since 
the strategic center was relatively weak vis-à-vis diasporic institutions. The 
ANM government wanted to take Armenia out of its post-Soviet isolation, and 
sought international contacts including with the diaspora. Government and 
diaspora interests started diverging early on in their collaboration. The first 
issue emerged with Armenia’s refusal to officially recognize Karabakh in order 
to avoid being internationally implicated in irredentism. But the diaspora ARF 
considered Karabakh the place holding the true values of ‘Armenianness’, 
unlike Armenia proper, and accused the ANM of ‘abandoning Karabakh’ 
(Panossian 1998). Although the diaspora initially took a back seat in 
influencing policy, it established its own local parties in both Armenia and 
Karabakh. Dashnak-based organizations such as the Armenian General 
Benevolence Union, the Armenian Assembly of America, and the Armenian-
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French singer Charles Aznavour became quickly involved in homeland affairs. 
In the Chechen case, both the strategic center and diaspora 
organizations were weak and created loose transnational relationships. From 
the outset of independence Dudayev’s regime did not enjoy the same 
domestic legitimacy as the other two secessionist movements due to electoral 
fraud, autocratic pressures, and inability to deliver internal security. 
Preoccupied with holding his grip on power, Dudayev invested little effort in 
the diaspora. For instrumental reasons he still forged links with influential 
individuals, such as the Russian-based Yaragi Mamadayev, who owned the 
biggest construction company in Chechnya and is believed to have mobilized 
political support for Dudayev (Lieven 1999). Moreover, during the first two 
years after independence the Chechen mafia enjoyed a silent blessing from 
the authorities, and reached its peak of local influence in the first two years 
after independence (Gall and De Waal 1998). The diaspora was weak as well. 
Chechens in Western Europe were few at the time. Chechens from Central 
Asia and Ukraine returned to Chechnya spontaneously rather than in an 
organized way (Lieven 1999). Primarily through charities, Sufi networks 
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connected diaspora Chechens to the homeland (Chauffor 2005). 
It is difficult to establish the exact links between the strategic centers 
and the clandestine networks. Observable implications suggest that such 
networks—enhanced by clan-based and extended family structures—played 
an important role in establishing these connections. Mafia networks in both 
the Chechen and Armenian cases emerged from the rising corruption in the 
Soviet Union since the 1970s, when criminal elements became fused with 
nomenklatura circles (Suny 1993). Voluntary or imposed remittances from 
Kosovars abroad and underground conomic activities accounted for 70 per 
cent of Kosovo’s entire economy (Adamson 2005). 
During the initial formation of transnational coalitions, diaspora 
members engaged primarily with a ‘contained contentious repertoire’, 
characterized by financial contributions and lobbying.7 Financially, Kosovars 
contributed 3 per cent of their incomes to the parallel structures. The 
Armenian Fund collected diaspora contributions for both Armenia and 
Karabakh. While no major diaspora lobby efforts were visible in the Chechen 
case, religious charities became a venue for activism. In terms of lobbying, the 
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AACL facilitated contacts between American senators and Albanian political 
figures from Kosovo, Albania and Macedonia (Hockenos 2003). It exerted 
limited impact on the US administration to pass the 1992 ‘Christmas 
Ultimatum’—a short telegram warning Serbia that the US would employ 
military force if a conflict erupted in Kosovo (Sullivan 2004). The Armenian 
diaspora influenced the 1992 passage of two acts by the US Congress—the 
Humanitarian Aid Corridor Act and Section 907 from the Freedom Support 
Act—aimed at preventing the US from rendering financial assistance to 
Azerbaijan due to its blockade on Armenia and Karabakh. This was a 
remarkable achievement, given the strong US interests in Azerbaijani oil. 
 
Process 3: Grave Violations of Human Rights Radicalize Diasporas 
Massacres, pogroms, and ethnic cleansing in the homeland serve as 
transformative events prompting diasporas to shift from contained to 
transgressive contention. Diasporas expand their repertoire to include fund-
raising for weapons, drafting of fighters, and aiding radical factions in the 
homeland. Formerly inactive diaspora members become mobilized. In short, a 
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communal threat prompts a communal response from diaspora circles. 
 
-------FIGURE 3 HERE ------- 
How does this shift in contention take place? As Carment et al argue, 
conflict escalation could occur through diffusion by way of information flows 
and transnational media (2006). Global media cover extensively grave 
violations of human rights, and indirectly expose diasporas to images of 
mutilated bodies, burials, and vandalized religious places. While such reports 
may trigger limited response from international organizations, they have a 
magnifying effect on diaspora populations. With their real or ‘imagined’ 
affective linkages to kin and identity locked in a collective trauma, diasporas 
experience powerful emotions of fear, anger and threat to their collective 
identity. Such emotions become instrumental in firming a population’s resolve 
to use violence (Petersen 2002). As Goldstone and Tilly (2001) argue, 
attribution of threat becomes a powerful mechanism mobilizing against 
repression ‘when the costs of not acting seem to be too great’. 
In Kosovo, grave human rights violations occurred in February 1998, 
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when Serbian military units massacred an entire extended family of a KLA 
commander in the Drenica region. This became a transformative event. In late 
March, more than 100,000 people demonstrated in front of Yugoslav 
embassies in major European and US cities (Hockenos 2003). The Homeland 
Calling Fund, established initially in Europe, shifted to the US where 
Albanians were more affluent. In New York, the roofer Florin Krasniqi 
fundraised for military equipment (Sullivan 2004). The US-based ‘Atlantic 
Battalion’ was formed to deliver fighters to Kosovo. Also, at least two busses 
of volunteers left from the UK, and others were drafted from Germany and 
Switzerland. The Drenica massacre gave additional credibility to the radicals, 
since in US public discourse they were not treated as ‘terrorists,’ but as 
fighters against a repressive regime (Sullivan 2004). 
In the Chechen case, the 1994 Russian invasion inflicted massive 
casualties and mobilized previously inactive diasporas in Jordan and Turkey. 
In Jordan, a newly formed Committee for the Support of the Chechen 
Republic organized solidarity rallies, sit-ins, charity bazaars, and humanitarian 
aid. It also appealed to leaders in the US, France, Middle East and Asia to 
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stop the violence (Shishani and Moore 2005). In Turkey, around 80 North 
Caucasian diaspora organizations – most notably the umbrella Confederation 
of Mountain Peoples of the North Caucasus – provided financial support to 
Chechen rebels (Trenin and Malashenko 2004). Family patriarchs told young 
men of Caucasian origin to fight in honor of the ‘ancestral’ homeland (Williams 
and Altindag 2005). Jihadi web-sites featured the death of ‘martyrs’ and 
stressed their Chechen origin (ibid). Wounded warriors enjoyed medical 
treatment in Turkey, most notably the Chechen propaganda Chief Movladi 
Ugudov (Trenin and Malashenko 2004). 
In the Armenia/Karabakh case grave violations of human rights took 
place in 1992 when the Azeri army still had an upper hand in the conflict (ICG 
2004). Paradoxically, the Armenian diaspora sent less than 200 Armenian 
fighters to Karabakh (Panossian 1998). The majority of external fighters came 
from Armenia, and some from Lebanon. Such behavior can largely be 
explained by Armenia’s military involvement in the war, rendering military 
support from other sources less relevant. Nevertheless, some diaspora 
members sponsored the war effort, especially in 1992 when the Azeri army 
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advanced on Armenian territory (Anonymous 2007). Civilian efforts were more 
visible, expanding to include humanitarian aid, increased lobbying and major 
individual contributions (ICG 2004). 
One can rightly argue that grave violations of human rights do not 
necessarily trigger massive radicalization in diaspora circles. Indeed, the 1988 
Azeri pogroms against Armenians in suburbs of Azerbaijan’s capital Baku left 
between 19 and 26 people killed, hundreds injured, and 14,000 refugees (De 
Waal 2003). The pogroms did not trigger diaspora political action, although 
they shocked it profoundly (Libaridian 1999). 
The answer to this puzzle is that timing and sequencing of 
transformative events matter for diaspora radicalization. If grave violations of 
human rights take place prior to diasporas’ engagement in a conflict spiral, 
they are less likely to have a radicalizing effect than if they occur in its 
aftermath. In the Armenian case, the diaspora did not understand the scope 
and direction of the nationalist movement in 1988, but was already collectively 
invested in Karabakh’s independence in 1992. 
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Process 4: Diasporas Influence the Radicalization of Domestic Politics 
Diasporas further influenced the radicalization of local politics when they 
reacted to another transformative event affecting the outcome of secessionism. In the 
Kosovo case, this transformative event was the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement which 
did not include a solution for Kosovo, and so delegitimized LDK’s non-violent 
strategy. In the Armenian/Karabakh case, this event was the 1994 cease-fire that 
ended the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Although Armenia de facto won that 
war, its victory did not translate into a new international status for Karabakh. In the 
Chechen case, this transformative event was the end of the first Chechen war in 1996. 
While the war ended with Russia’s de facto defeat, Chechnya was not granted legal 
independence. In the aftermath of these events, local elites started losing credibility 
that they could achieve the secessionist goal. 
 
--- FIGURE 4 HERE ----- 
These transformative events started eroding the already established 
transnational coalitions. Alternative identity entrepreneurs reached out for diaspora 
support. Although all diasporas eventually exerted radicalization influences on 
homeland politics, the mechanisms through which they arrived there were different. In 
the Kosovo case ethnic outbidding took place (Adamson 2009), centered on a clash of 
strategies. After Dayton, LDK’s leadership weakened domestically. A rift opened 
between President Rugova and Prime Minister Bukoshi, leading to internal 
competition for influence within diaspora circles and reduced contributions for 
the parallel structures (ICG 1998). KLA operatives used this rift to infuse their 
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own vision for a change of strategy from non-violence to guerilla warfare. 
Bukoshi (2002) argued that he proposed the KLA to join efforts with the exiled 
government in order to receive funding and international legitimacy. The KLA 
rejected his proposition and started building its own networks, considering 
‘Rugova and company as traitors’ (Thaci 2002).  
The diaspora shifted its support from the shadow government to the 
KLA in 1998. Major voluntary contributions started flowing from the US, 
Canada, Australia, Germany and Switzerland. A single charitable event in 
New York, Michigan, California and Alaska raised USD 16,000-56,000 (Judah 
2000). Diaspora funds were often used to purchase cheap AK-47s from the 
black market. Procured arms helped guerillas within Kosovo to stage attacks 
on Serbian police stations. As Serbia deployed more military and paramilitary 
units, Albanian villagers fled and Serbian troops looted their houses. This 
tactic served as ‘the most effective recruitment drive the KLA could have 
hoped for’ (Sullivan, 2004). 
Ethnic outbidding was possible as a mechanism emanating from a 
strong strategic center extending local political processes into the 
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transnational realm. In the two other cases the strategic center was not strong 
enough to have a powerful transnational effect. The transnational coalitions 
dissipated through different mechanisms. In the Armenian/Karabakh case 
dissipation stemmed from a clash of interests between a weak strategic center 
and a powerful diaspora. The first move of diaspora withdrawal was in 1992, 
when the diaspora-appointed Foreign Minister Hovannisian resigned in 
opposition to governmental policies concerning Turkey. Locked into its 
traumatic identity, the Armenian diaspora insisted that Turkey’s recognition of 
the 1915 genocide precede any rapprochement with Armenia. Further 
diaspora resentment followed ARF’s ban as a political party in 1995 on the 
grounds that it was foreign-based and funded. This move boosted ARF’s 
domestic and international reputation, following a well known effect: weak 
repression used against well-mobilized groups often boosts the reputation of 
the repressed. As a result, the ARF mobilized its wide international networks 
in a sustained anti-government campaign (Panossian 1998). Although major 
domestic factors such as internal party opposition, economic scarcities, and a 
militarized economy led to the successful 1998 palace coup against 
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Petrossian, diaspora entrepreneurs did contribute to the radicalization of local 
politics. With their support, former fighters in the Karabakh war – most notably 
former Armenian President Robert Kocharian – entered office. 
In the Chechen case the already weak coalition dissipated through a 
clash of values between a secular Chechen diaspora and growing Islamism 
within the country. Shortly after the first war, Dudayev was assassinated and 
an Islamist opposition under Shamil Basayev picked up the banner of 
secessionism. Using a religious rather than ethno-national appeal, the 
strategic center attracted a growing body of Wahhabi fighters from Saudi 
Arabia, other Middle Eastern countries and Pakistan (Murphy 2004). A shift of 
support from a nationality-based to a religious diaspora occurred for two 
reasons. Unlike Albanians or Armenians, Chechens lived primarily in Russia, 
and were vulnerable to repression. Targeted police interventions demolished 
offices of a Chechen cultural center, and backed other criminal groups, hence 
diminishing both civic and mafia influences (Lieven 1999, RFE/RL 2002). 
Moreover, the secular values of a Chechen diaspora were challenged by 
radical Islamic ideas emanating from within Chechnya, most notably the 
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introduction of Sharia Law (Tishkov 2004). 
 
Conclusion  
This article sought to deepen the understanding of how diasporas exert a 
radicalizing impact on secessionist conflicts in their homelands. I argued that 
despite differences in diaspora communal characteristics and the secessionist 
conflicts themselves, a common pattern of diaspora mobilization emerges. 
Diasporas exert radicalizing influences on homeland politics at two specific junctures 
– when grave violations of human rights occur in the homeland and when local 
moderate elites start losing credibility that they can achieve the secessionist goal. 
Diasporas become a radicalization force only after engaging in a conflict spiral and 
influencing it by participating in four mobilization processes. First, they enter the 
conflict spiral after local secessionists proclaim independence. Although individual 
diaspora members may be connected to secessionists prior to the declaration of 
independence, diasporas endorse secessionism en masse only in its aftermath. 
Independence becomes a focal point for mobilization because it triggers mechanisms 
connecting traumatic parts of the diasporic identity to messages of injustice developed 
by the local elites. Secondly, local secessionists broker transnational coalitions with 
major diaspora organizations and influential individuals. These coalitions endure to 
varying degrees depending on the strength of the secessionist strategic center vis-à-vis 
the diaspora institutions. A third process is triggered by grave violations of human 
rights, which become a transformative event for diaspora mobilization. Exposed to 
large-scale violence through the international media, diasporas attribute threat to their 
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conflict-generated traumatic identities. Diaspora entrepreneurs expand contention to a 
larger circle of participants and to transgressive practices. Finally, established 
transnational coalitions start to dissipate when local secessionists begin losing 
credibility that they can achieve the secessionist goal. Different mechanisms drive this 
process: ethnic outbidding and clash over strategy (Kosovo), clash over interests 
(Karabakh), and clash over values (Chechnya). As a result, diasporas switch their 
allegiance to more radical competitors.  
How generalizable are these findings? As mentioned earlier, this study limited 
the scope of inquiry to conflict-generated diasporas linked to secessionist cases in the 
post-communist world, anchored in autonomous regions seeking self-determination 
from ethno-national federations. In this sense, these findings make narrow claims 
related to the Albanian, Armenian, and Chechen cases. 
Nevertheless, I maintain that these findings have relevance to a broader 
universe of cases. While grave human rights violations radicalize diaspora politics, if 
they take place before a diaspora is mobilized in a conflict spiral, they are less likely 
to have a strong radicalizing impact. By being part of the conflict spiral, diaspora 
organizations and individuals become emotionally and financially invested in the 
desired political outcome, as in the Armenian case. A slightly modified variant is 
manifested in the case of the Sikh diaspora with regard to Khalistan. As Fair writes, 
diaspora support for the conflict peaked in response to the Indian army invasion of a 
major Sikh temple in 1984. But because the diaspora was not well mobilized to 
support the insurgents, the momentum was quickly lost (2007).  
Furthermore, the strength of a strategic center and the strength of the diaspora 
institutions matter in relationship to each other. A strong Armenian ARF and a weak 
Armenian state resemble a strong Israeli lobby, AIPAC, and an Israeli state, stronger 
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than the Armenian, but still relatively weak with regard to its diaspora. The existence 
of two major poles could predict strong clashes of interests, as Shain observed in 
2002. However, in many other cases, including Kosovo and Chechnya, the strategic 
centers were stronger than the diaspora institutions. For example, during the 1992-
1995 war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Croatian center was strong and the diaspora 
institutions were weaker. Thus, local political processes were transplanted into 
diaspora politics. 
Grave violations of human rights and loss of credibility of local actors could 
be good predictors that diasporas will expand their transgressive contentious 
repertoire and that transnational coalitions may dissipate when facing more radical 
competitors. For example, the 2008 Israeli bombing of Gaza created a large-scale 
mobilization of the Palestinian diaspora. The moderate Palestinian Authority lost 
large-scale support in diaspora circles, while its radical Islamic competitor, Hamas, 
gained new support. 
The last two points relate to my policy recommendations. When grave 
violations of human rights occur in violent conflicts, and when local actors start losing 
credibility, international policy-makers largely focus on how to provide humanitarian 
aid to refugees, broker cease-fires, and support moderates. They pay little attention to 
the radicalization of diaspora politics in their own liberal states that occurs 
simultaneously to peace-building initiatives. Creating policies to address the specific 
timing of clashing external influences on the conflict spiral could aid the overall 
peace-building effort. 
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1
 Armenia has not yet recognized Karabakh, but Karabakh citizens carry Armenian passports, use 
Armenian currency, and war-time leaders occupy important political positions. 
2
 Estimated numbers of Armenians: Russia (2,000,000), US (800,000), Georgia (400,000), France 
(250,000), Lebanon (105,000), Iran (100,000), Ukraine (70,000), Argentina (60,000), Turkey (60,000), 
Canada (40,000), Australia (30,000) (Tölölyan, 2000). 
3
 Estimated numbers of Albanians: US (250,000), Switzerland (150,000), Germany (350,000), Italy 
(250,000), Turkey (250,000) (CDS, 2002). 
4
 Estimated numbers of Chechens: Turkey (100,000), Jordan (8,000), Egypt (5,000), Syria (4,000), Iraq 
(2,500) (Kailani 2002); Russia and the Former Soviet Union (300,000) (Lieven 1999). Jordan: 
Circassians (95,000), and Chechens (15,000) (Wesseling 1997). 
5
 I adapt Schelling’s (1960) understanding of a focal point’s importance for mobilization under 
information deficiencies. 
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6
 According to Tilly and Tarrow, claim-making is the ‘claim bearing on someone else’s interests, 
leading to coordinated efforts and programs, in which governments are involved, initiators of claims or 
third parties’ (2007). 
7
 ‘Contained contention’ entails ‘well established means of claim making’ in episodic, public, and 
collective interaction with other claim makers. Goals are achieved through peaceful means. Politics 
becomes ‘transgressive’ when collective claims expand to include more extreme agendas, verbal and 
physical violence (McAdam et al, 2001). 
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Diasporas and Secessionist Conflicts 
 
Table 1 
 
Major Diaspora Characteristics 
 
Diaspora Age Spread Size* Institutionalization 
High level: 
entrenched divisions 
between two major 
blocks. 
Armenian 
Classic: Prior to 
the modern 
period, large-
scale after 1915 
Global ca 4 million 
* 
  
Albanian 
Modern: Early 
20th century, 
mostly after 
1989 
Predominantly 
Western 
hemisphere 
More than 1 
million** 
Middle level: Primarily 
as of the mid-1980s 
Chechen 
Incipient: 
during 
communism 
and after 1989 
Predominantly 
Russia and 
former Soviet 
republics, 
Middle East 
Ca 
420,000*** 
Low level: little 
institutionalization 
apart from Russia  
 
These numbers represent conservative estimates and incorporate multiple 
generations of migrants. Thus, they do not directly relate to the much narrower scope of 
this study’s definition considering a ‘diaspora’ only those members of a community who 
make a diasporic claim. 
 * Tölölyan, p.107.; ** Kosta, 2004, Sheffer, p.106.; *** Lieven, p.100, Kailani, 2002; 
Brauer, pp.387-400. 
 
Web-links to Chronologies on the Secessionist Conflicts 
Kosovo: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kosovo_War 
Karabakh: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nagorno-Karabakh_War 
Chechnya: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Chechen_War 
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Diasporas and Secessionist Conflicts 
 
Figure 1 
 
Process 1: 
Diasporas Engagement in a Conflict Spiral 
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Figure 2 
 
Process 2:  
Building Transnational Coalitions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       `Strong  
 
 
         
         
 
         Weak  
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strategic 
center 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strong 
 
 
 
 
 
Weak 
Diaspora 
institu- 
tions 
 
 
 
 
 
Strong 
 
 
 
 
 
Weak 
 
Brokerage 
Transnational 
coalitions 
 
 
 
 
 
Weak 
Armenian case 
 
 
Strong 
(Albanian 
case) 
 
Loose 
(Chechen case) 
Page 46 of 48
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rers  ethnic@surrey.ac.uk
Ethnic and Racial Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
Diasporas and Secessionist Conflicts 
 
Figure 3 
 
Mobilization Step 3:  
Grave Violations of Human Rights Radicalize Diasporas 
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Figure 4 
 
Process 4: 
 
Diasporas Influence the Radicalization of Domestic Politics 
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